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Contracting and the Division of the Gains from Trade
1 Introduction
Trade liberalization can generate substantial improvements in welfare through increased varieties,
lower prices and the reallocation of resources from less to more efficient producers. This paper
examines how the behavior of importers and their interactions with exporters affect the division of
the gains from trade. Trading partners make endogenous choices among different types of contracts.
Trade liberalization affects the choice of contracts between exporters and importers. This change
in the microstructure of import markets leads to qualitatively different results for the division of
the gains from trade. Foreign exporters and domestic importers potentially benefit at the expense
of domestic consumers.
In line with the concerns of the European Commission and the Federal Trade Commission,
market integration can induce firms to replace trade barriers with contracts that limit the gains from
market access to consumers (Raff and Schmitt 2005). Typically, foreign competition is associated
with lower price-cost margins (Tybout 2003; Levinsohn 1993; Harrison 1994) but a growing literature
documents that the pass-through of border prices into home market prices is low in macro studies
and in detailed micro work.1 In our framework, the low pass-through of trade cost reductions into
import prices is a result of changes in the contracts between exporters and importers.
Following Hart and Tirole (1990), we consider contracting choices that move away from anony-
mous market transactions to allow for richer effects of trade liberalization on import markets. These
contracts arise to address two inefficiencies from anonymous market transactions. First, when ex-
porters and importers engage through anonymous transactions with market-clearing prices, market
power of importers leads to double marginalization and lower profits. Exporters can overcome this
inefficiency by moving away from unit prices and offering bilateral contracts that specify fixed pay-
ments and quantities. Second, an importer in an anonymous market is unable to internalize the
business stealing effect of his sales on competing importers that sell varieties of the same foreign
product. The exporter can mitigate this externality by investing in joint contracts with these com-
peting importers. This leads to higher profits by restricting sales and driving up prices charged to
consumers. We embed the choices of bilateral and joint contracts into a standard trade model, and
show how trade liberalization affects the division of the gains from trade through changes in the
contractual choice between exporters and importers.
Building on Aghion et al. (2006), our main assumption is that investments in joint contracts
1See for example Engel and Rogers (1996); Burstein et al. (2003); Campa and Goldberg (2005) in the macro
literature. Detailed micro studies include Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) for Swedish pharmaceuticals, De Loecker
et al. (2012) and Mallick and Marques (2008) for Indian manufacturing, Badinger (2007) for manufacturing and
services in the European Single Market, and Konings et al. (2005) for Bulgarian and Romanian manufacturing
industries.
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embody product-specific knowledge that can be used by the other party in the event of a disagree-
ment. This drives a wedge between the impact of trade liberalization on the exporter’s profit from
bilateral and joint contracts. Lower trade costs imply importers forgo a higher level of profits in
the event of a disagreement with the exporter. Trade liberalization therefore strengthens the bar-
gaining power of exporters and increases their incentive to negotiate joint contracts. We refer to
this as the “contracting choice effect” of trade liberalization. The contracting choice effect leads to
higher prices because an exporter is able to reduce competition through a joint contract with her
importers. We show the contracting choice effect can dominate the standard gains from lower trade
costs and variety expansion, leading to a rise in profits at the expense of consumer welfare. Trade
liberalization therefore alters the absolute and relative gains from trade across consumers, exporters
and importers.
To test for the contracting choice effect, we would ideally like to examine the impact of trade
liberalization on the actual contracts between exporters and importers. Such data is unavailable
so we examine distinct implications of the framework on prices, quantities and exporter-importer
matches during a period of trade liberalization. If contracting choice matters, trade liberalization
will induce exporters to consolidate their import market by simultaneously increasing price, reducing
the total quantity sold, and lowering the number of importing partners in the liberalizing country.
We test these implications for Colombian imports before and after the US-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) using transaction-level matched importer-exporter data. In keeping with the
theory, we find that US exporters whose products started to enjoy duty-free access through the
FTA were more likely to raise their import prices, ship lower quantities and reduce the number of
their importer partners in Colombia.
This paper introduces contacting choices in a trade model with heterogeneous exporters and
heterogeneous importers to see how market power in exporting and importing changes the gains
from trade. This is related to several different strains of work in international trade. Bernard et al.
(2009), Castellani et al. (2010) and Muuls and Pisu (2009) document the substantial heterogeneity
across importing firms for the US, Italy and Belgium respectively and also show that importers
differ from non-importers. Papers by Rauch (1999), Rauch and Watson (2004), Antràs and Costinot
(2011), Chaney (2014) and Petropoulou (2011) model the formation of matches between exporters
and importers. These papers adopt a search and matching approach to match formation. We
abstract from these mechanisms and focus on the contracting choice between the trading parties to
understand the division of surplus.
A growing literature also shows how imported inputs increase the productivity of importers,
see Amiti and Konings (2007), Halpern et al. (forthcoming) and Boler et al. (forthcoming). We do
not consider production side gains and instead focus on consumption side gains, similar to a large
literature on the impact of trade liberalization on markups and prices. Tybout (2003) surveys the
2
Contracting and the Division of the Gains from Trade
research using industry-level data and plant-level panel data and concludes that most studies find
higher industry-level exposure to foreign competition is associated with lower price-cost margins
or markups, e.g. Levinsohn (1993); Harrison et al. (2005). The pass-through of reductions in
trade costs to domestic prices is typically low, and recent studies find the behavior of domestic
firms determines the extent to which trade policy affects prices at home. Mallick and Marques
(2008) find low tariff rate pass-through into import prices in Indian manufacturing during the
liberalization of 1991. De Loecker et al. (2012) estimate that on average, factory-gate prices fell by
18 percent despite average import tariff declines of 62 percentage points, as domestic Indian firms
did not pass on the reductions in trade costs to consumers. Badinger (2007) finds the European
Single Market led to an overall reduction in markups for manufacturing products, but markups
rose in several manufacturing and services industries that also experienced an increase in industry
concentration and average firm size. In early work on Japanese imports, Lawrence and Saxonhouse
(1991) document that the presence of large conglomerates at home is associated with lower import
penetration, suggesting the import-inhibiting effects of firms with high market power. Lawrence
(1991) argues market power of intermediaries can explain why Japanese consumer prices were higher
than German import prices for the same export from the US.
We build on the vertical relations literature in industrial organization to model the relationship
between exporters and importers. The focus on vertical relations is related to work in international
trade on intermediation (Akerman 2010; Bernard et al. 2010; Blum et al. 2010; Ahn et al. 2011;
Atkin and Donaldson 2012), retailing (Eckel 2009; Raff and Schmitt 2012; Blanchard et al. 2013) and
vertical integration (Feenstra et al. 2003; Antràs and Helpman 2004; Conconi et al. 2012). Raff and
Schmitt (2005, 2009) examine importer market power in an oligopoly model of trade and retailing to
show trade liberalization can reduce welfare due to vertical restraints. We embed vertical restraints
in a general setting with many heterogeneous exporters and importers to obtain predictions that
can be taken to the data. Our pricing predictions are related to work on competition policy (Neary
2003; Evenett and Stern 2011) and the Metzler paradox (Venables 1985; Bagwell and Staiger 2012;
Bagwell and Lee 2015). In early work, Venables (1985) shows unilateral reductions in trade barriers
can increase consumer prices in the liberalizing country when entry and exit induce profit shifting
across countries.
Our paper is also closely related to the recent set of papers using matched exporter-importer
data. Blum et al. (2010, 2012) examine characteristics of trade transactions for the exporter-
importer pairs of Chile-Colombia and Argentina-Chile while Eaton et al. (2012) consider exports of
Colombian firms to specific importing firms in the United States. Carballo et al. (2013) and Bernard
et al. (2014) use matched data to study the role of buyers in firm-level trade flows. Unlike these
papers, we concentrate on the role of contracting between the buyer and seller and the resulting
effects on prices, quantities and the division of the gains from trade.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a contracting choice model
where exporters and importers transact through anonymous markets, bilateral contracts or joint
contracts. Trade liberalization affects the division of the gains from trade among domestic con-
sumers, home importers, and foreign exporters. Section 3 develops the key predictions of the model
on prices, quantities, and matches. Section 4 takes the observable implications to Colombian import
data and Section 5 concludes.
2 Contracting Choice Model of Exporters and Importers
This section describes the economy which consists of consumers, exporters and importers. We work
with a standard trade model akin to Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008), and introduce contracting
arrangements between exporters and importers. The model is specified to provide the simplest
setting that leads to an impact of trade liberalization on consumer welfare through changes in the
contracts between exporters and importers.
There are two countries, Home and Foreign (with x indexing exports from the foreign country
to the home country). Differentiated products are produced at home and abroad, and further
differentiated by domestic firms (importers) who sell to consumers. The home country has L
workers, each of whom is endowed with a unit of labor and has preferences over consumption goods,
as defined in the next sub-section. Having specified the preferences, we discuss how consumption
goods for the workers are exported from the foreign country and imported into the home country.
2.1 Preferences
Each worker has identical preferences over a homogeneous good and varieties of a differentiated good.
To ease interpersonal welfare comparisons, preferences are quasilinear. Preferences for differentiated
goods follow a standard nested CES form. The assumption of CES preferences provides the simplest
way to describe how consumer prices differ when exporters and importers engage in different types
of contracts.
A differentiated product in the upper nest is indexed by i, and is a composite of further differ-
entiated variants in the lower nest which are indexed by ij. The utility function is as follows:
U = q0 +Q
θ/θ, Q ≡
(ˆ
qρi di
)1/ρ
, qi =
(ˆ
qηijdj
)1/η
, 0 < θ < ρ < η < 1.
The homogeneous good q0 is produced one for one with labor in a perfectly competitive market and
can be traded freely. As is well-known, this eliminates income effects from trade liberalization and
allows us to focus on the price effects which differ from standard trade models. Assuming both goods
are consumed in equilibrium, the demand for variety ij is qij = p
1/(η−1)
ij p
(η−ρ)/(η−1)(ρ−1)
i P
(ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
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and the indirect utility for a worker with income I is
U = I + ((1− θ)/θ)P−θ/(1−θ), P =
(ˆ
p
ρ/(ρ−1)
i di
)(ρ−1)/ρ
, pi ≡
(ˆ
p
η/(η−1)
ij dj
)(η−1)/η
.
We normalize labor earnings to one and describe how the differentiated varieties are supplied to
workers.
2.2 Exporters
Following Krugman (1980), each exporter supplies a unique differentiated product. Exporters are
monopolistically competitive and pay fixed operation costs fx. The production function for product
i is xi = li/c. Following Melitz (2003), exporters differ in their unit costs c and we index them by c
(rather than i). As we are interested in the division of the gains from trade, the mass of potential
entrants is fixed as in Bernard et al. (2003) to allow for positive profits.
2.3 Importers
Exporters cannot directly access the final consumers in the home country. They must engage
importers to deliver these goods. Each exporter meets a continuum of importers drawn from a
cost distribution, Gd with support [dmin, dmax]. Importers transform the exporter’s product into
differentiated varieties. An importer with productivity 1/d transforms exporter c’s product into
y(c, d) = x(c)/τd units of the final differentiated variety. If m(c) is the unit price of variety c
charged by the exporter, then the unit cost of an importer is τm(c)d where τ > 1 is the iceberg
trade cost for imported varieties. Under this formulation, importers perform the function of lowering
the costs of delivery to final consumers.
2.4 Anonymous Markets
A natural way of introducing importers into a standard trade model is through anonymous market
transactions. An exporter chooses the market price for her product and then takes her product
to an import market. We start with anonymous markets in this sub-section and then proceed to
specifying bilateral contracts and joint contracts.
The importers choose how much to buy. They further differentiate the product and supply a
final variety to consumers. The cd indexes a variety exported by c and imported by d. We start with
this benchmark case to illustrate the inefficiencies that lead to richer contracts between exporters
and importers. To formalize the setting, the timing is as follows.
• Exporters and importers meet each other.
• Unit costs of exporters and importers (c and d) are observed.
• Exporters pay the fixed costs fx of exporting to the import market.
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• Exporter c chooses her market price m(c).
• Importer d buys xcd units from the exporter.
• Quantities qcd are supplied to final consumers.
We solve for an equilibrium by first determining the final quantities sold by importers to final
consumers. Then we derive the importers’ demand for the exporter’s product and determine the
optimal price chosen by the exporter.
2.4.1 Importer Sales
Importers choose final quantity qcd to maximize the following profit function:
max
qcd
piMcd =
(
p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)− τmcd
)
qcd
whereM denotes an anonymous market. Taking aggregate quantities qc and Q as given, the optimal
price chosen by d is
pcd =τmcd/η.
The markup 1/η depends on the differentiation parameter in the lower nest of the CES utility
function. Substituting for the optimal price, importer d’s demand for exporter c’s product is
xcd = τdqcd = (η/mc) p
η/(η−1)
cd p
(η−ρ)/(η−1)(ρ−1)
c P
(ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1).
2.4.2 Exporter Sales
Exporter c observes the demand for her product from all importers, and chooses the market price
mc to maximize profits
max
mc
piMc =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
(mc − c)xcddGd.
Taking qc into account, the total demand for exporter c’s product is
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
xcd = (η/mc) p
ρ/(ρ−1)
c P
(ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1) (1)
where pc = τmcd¯/η and the average import cost is d¯η/(η−1) ≡
´ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
dη/(η−1)dGd. Exporter
c chooses to sell to all importers because she benefits from having more differentiated varieties
(dmax(c) = dmax).2
2In the next section, we introduce fixed costs per importer (
´ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
fdxdGd) and study how the importer cost
cutoff dmax(c) varies across c. We assume throughout that the exporter’s contracting costs and fixed costs are
relatively higher than the importer’s. For simplicity, Sections 2 and 3 set the contracting costs and the fixed costs
incurred by importers to zero because this does not affect the key outcomes of interest in the model.
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The optimal price chosen by c is mc = c/ρ. This shows that anonymous market transactions
lead to two inefficiencies in the relationship. First, exporters take into account the derived de-
mand for their product and charge c/ρ (instead of c). Importers further mark up the price to
p = τmcd/η = τcd/ρη. This double marginalization leads to lower bilateral profits.3 Second, com-
petition among importers in the final goods market implies profit for a particular product is not
maximized. Importers do not account for the substitutability of their varieties with those of other
importers who sell the exporter’s products. They cannibalize each other’s demand and this business
stealing lowers multilateral profits.
2.4.3 Market Entry
Importer d’s profit under the optimal market price pcd = τcd/ρη is
piMcd (d) = (1− η)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
d/d¯
)η/(η−1) (
τcd¯/ρη
)ρ/(ρ−1)
. (2)
The equilibrium profit of exporter c from sales to all its importers is
piMc = η(1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τcd¯/ρη
)ρ/(ρ−1)
. (3)
Exporters supply their products abroad as long as piMc ≥ fx. Defining z ≡ cd¯, the cutoff cost for
operational varieties, zMx, is given by η(1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1) (τzMx/ρη)ρ/(ρ−1) = fx. Proceeding
analogously for domestic products (with τ = 1 and fixed costs of operation f), we can solve for the
ratio of the import to domestic cost cutoff. This ratio is (zMx/zM )ρ/(ρ−1) = fx/fτρ/(ρ−1) and the
importing cost cutoff is lower as long as the export costs are sufficiently higher than the domestic
selling cost (fxτρ/(1−ρ) ≥ f).
2.5 Contractual Choices
Exporters and importers often have long-standing and complex relationships. It is therefore likely
that they engage in contracts that overcome the inefficiencies from anonymous market transactions.
Following the seminal work of Hart and Tirole (1990), we consider two distinct contracts that over-
come these inefficiencies. The first type of contract overcomes double marginalization by specifying
quantities and payments that maximize bilateral profits of the exporter-importer pair. The second
type of contract overcomes double marginalization and business stealing by specifying quantities
and payments that maximize joint profits of an exporter and her importers.
The main advantage of the Hart-Tirole approach is that we do not need to specify the con-
tractual instruments through which firms maximize bilateral profits or joint profits, and instead
can focus on the observable outcomes of quantities and payments that result from implementing
3An alternative assumption is that exporters do not account for the aggregate effect of their actions on their price
index pc. This would not affect our qualitative results on double marginalization but the exporter’s markup would
be mc = c/η instead of c/ρ.
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profit-maximizing contracts. For instance, an exporter can maximize bilateral profits by setting a
two-part tariff that charges the importer a price equal to her marginal cost (mc = c), and a fixed
fee that recoups part or all of the bilateral profits without changing sales incentives. The exporter
could also have maximized bilateral profits through resale price maintenance. The importer is then
obliged to sell at a price chosen by the exporter. As we will show later in this Section, when the
exporter chooses the final price of pcd = τcd/η, the resulting quantity allocation is the same as the
two-part tariff case and bilateral profits of the exporter-importer pair are maximized.
The industrial organization literature provides different methods through which firms can avoid
double marginalization (e.g. fixed fees, quantity discounts, resale price maintenance etc).4 The
specific methods through which firms implement bilateral or joint profit maximization with other
firms are rarely observable, and these methods can often take the form of informal practices that
are sustained through repeated interaction. Following Hart and Tirole (1990), we therefore abstract
from the methods used to implement contracts that maximize bilateral or joint profits, and focus
instead on the implications for observable outcomes, such as quantity allocations, that are the same
across different methods.
We start with bilateral profit maximization and then discuss joint profit maximization. The
market does not maximize bilateral profits of an exporter-importer pair due to double marginal-
ization. This problem is overcome when an exporter engages in a bilateral private contract with
an importer. The bilateral contract specifies a final quantity and payments (qcd and Tcd). As the
exporter no longer relies on unit prices that are marked up, the final quantity is chosen to maximize
the bilateral profit of the exporter-importer pair. Following Horn and Wolinsky (1988), the exporter
and the importer split the bilateral profits through Nash bargaining, and this determines the pay-
ments from the importer to the exporter. The bilateral contract overcomes double marginalization
and results in higher quantities and lower prices for the final consumers.
While bilateral contracts overcome double marginalization, they do not mitigate the business
stealing externality imposed by importers on each other. The competition between different im-
porters implies that prices are lower than the monopolistic price that the exporter would have
chosen. The key insight of Hart and Tirole (1990) is that a seller cannot commit to selling lower
quantities of her product because she would prefer to bypass her existing importers and sell more
to earn higher profits. Even though the exporter could offer contracts that account for the business
stealing externality, this opportunism of the exporter prevents importers from accepting such offers
because they know the exporter would find it more profitable to deviate from these contracts. The
exporter’s opportunism prevents maximization of multilateral joint profits.
To overcome this problem, the exporter can commit to restricting the total sales of her product
4This is an area of ongoing research in industrial organization and Miklos-Thal et al. (2010) provide an overview
of the findings.
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to induce higher consumer prices by forming a joint contract with her importers.5 Just like bilateral
contracts, joint contracts specify bilateral quantities and payments, but now the total quantity of
the exporter qc is also specified in the contract and is not simply an outcome of the different
bilateral contracts. Joint contracts can be implemented through various methods such as vertical
integration that would eliminate the exporter’s opportunism by aligning the interests of all parties.
The integrated parties would internalize business stealing to maximize joint profits, and consumers
would end up with lower quantities and higher prices than under bilateral contracts. The exporter
could also implement joint profit maximization through other methods. For instance, importers
would internalize business stealing if the exporter assigns them exclusive territories to sell the
exporter’s varieties. The outcomes of the joint contract can also be replicated through “implicit
exclusive dealing” when exporters have reputational concerns due to repeated interaction with their
importers (Rey and Tirole 2007). We abstract from the specific methods through which joint
profit maximization is implemented, and focus instead on observable outcomes such as prices and
quantities.
To formally model the different market structures resulting from these contracts, we specify the
timing as follows:6
• Exporters and importers meet each other.
• Unit costs of exporters and their importers (c and d) are observed.
• Exporter c proposes bilateral or joint contracts.
• Importers decide whether to accept c’s proposal.
• Exporters and importers pay the fixed costs of bilateral or joint contracts.
• Importers order quantities xcd from the exporters.
• Quantities qcd are supplied to final consumers.
2.6 Bilateral Private Contracts
To overcome double marginalization, an exporter can make fixed investments in bilateral contracts
that depart from linear pricing. After paying the fixed costs, an exporter engages in private contracts
with each importer bilaterally. Importers hold passive beliefs which means that they expect the
5Joint contracts often refer to cross-ownership between the parties. We use the term joint contract to refer to a
contacting choice between the exporter and importer which might, but does not necessarily, include cross-ownership.
Martin et al. (2001) and Mollers et al. (2014) use experimental data to show vertical restraints of various forms (that
do not entail vertical integration of firms) are sufficient to maximize joint profits.
6No new information is revealed after the fixed costs are paid. If the fixed costs of each party are sunk, then
the opportunism problem remains but it would be more reasonable to think that the division of surplus is over the
revenues, rather than the profits net of fixed costs.
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contracts offered to the other importers to be fixed at their equilibrium values. We first discuss the
surplus division, and then proceed to determining optimal prices and entry into bilateral contracts.
2.6.1 Importer Payments
Under bilateral contracts, the importer’s profit function is
piBcd =p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)qcd − Tcd
where Tcd is the payment to exporter c for supplying xcd = τdqcd units of her product. The importer
holds passive beliefs so he takes the contracts offered to his competitors as given ((Tˆcd′ , qˆcd′) for any
d′ 6= d).
The exporter’s profit from selling to all her importers is
pic =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[Tcd − τcdqcd] dGd. (4)
For flexibility, we follow Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and assume that the payments are set through
bilateral Nash bargaining with β denoting the bargaining power of the exporter. Using experimental
data, Martin et al. (2001) show that the ability to reject an upstream firm’s offer enables the
downstream firm to get a positive share of the surplus from the relationship.
In the event of a disagreement, the exporter has no other importer to turn to and the importer
receives nothing from the exporter. The disagreement payoff for each party is therefore zero. The
optimal payment is the solution to
max
Tcd
[
p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)qcd − Tcd
]1−β
[Tcd − τcdqcd]β .
As d takes the contracts offered to other importers as given, the optimal payment is
Tˆcd =
[
βp(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ) + (1− β)τcd
]
qcd (5)
which ensures the division of gross surplus is proportional to the bargaining weights.
2.6.2 Optimal Prices
Substituting for the optimal payments into the exporter’s problem, c chooses quantities to maximize:
max
qcd
piBc =β
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[
p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)− τcd
]
qcddGd.
The profit function shows that each importer ignores how his quantity affects the profit of other
importers of exporter c’s product (through qc). The exporter therefore cannot force the “monopoly”
price that maximizes multilateral profits.
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As earlier, the exporter finds it optimal to sell to all importers. Now the exporter can overcome
double marginalization, and no longer charges m = c/ρ. The optimal contract is equivalent to a
two-part tariff where the exporters do not mark up their costs and set the price of the marginal unit
equal to marginal cost, m = c. The double marginalization inefficiency is eliminated and exporters
extract part of the surplus through payments Tcd from importers. The optimal price charged by
importers is
pB =τcd/η < pM = τcd/ρη. (6)
We summarize this result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Bilateral private contracts ensure lower prices than anonymous market transactions
because they eliminate double marginalization.
2.6.3 Entry into Bilateral Contracts
Even though cost savings are passed on to consumers, the total variety profit is higher. An exporter
prefers bilateral contracts to anonymous markets as long as piBc − fbx ≥ piMc − fx where fbx > fx is
the cost of writing a bilateral contract. Recalling z ≡ cd¯, the cost cutoff for imported varieties that
earn higher profits under bilateral contracts, zBx, is:
P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1) (τzBx/η)ρ/(ρ−1)
[
β(1− η)− η(1− ρ)/ρρ/(ρ−1)
]
= fbx − fx (7)
As expected, a fall in trade costs increases the cost cutoff zBx through its direct effect on import
costs. The price index also responds to trade costs and a higher price index further increases the
ability to import. The cost cutoff ratio for bilateral contracts and market transactions is
(zBx/zMx)
ρ/(ρ−1) = (fbx − fx) /fx
[
β(1− η)
η(1− ρ)/ρρ/(ρ−1) − 1
]
≥ 1. (8)
We assume the RHS is greater than one to ensure bilateral contracts are viable for more productive
exporter-importer pairs.
Bilateral contracts overcome double marginalization, but not business stealing. The next sub-
section discusses joint contracts that mitigate business stealing through multilateral profit maxi-
mization by the exporter.
2.7 Joint Contracts
By partnering with her importers, an exporter can ensure that the profit from her product is
maximized by internalizing the business stealing effect imposed by importers on each other. Joint
contracts provide higher prices, but involve larger fixed investments in building a relationship.
Following the vertical relations literature in industrial organization and international economics, we
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assume fjx > fbx > fx. When firms make these investments, variety-specific knowledge is imparted
to the importers and we show that this leads to changes in the contracts after trade liberalization.
We start with a discussion of the surplus division within the joint contract and then determine the
optimal prices and entry into joint contracts.
2.7.1 Importer Payments
When the exporter negotiates jointly with her importers, the importer’s profit function is the same
as earlier but now the exporter’s total quantity is no longer taken as given. In a joint contract, the
importer chooses quantities qcd to maximize
piJcd(d) =p(qcd, qc, Qˆ)qcd − Tcd.
The exporter’s profit from selling to all importers is
piJc =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
picd(c) =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[Tcd − τcdqcd] dGd. (9)
The split of profits and hence the payments Tcd are again determined by Nash bargaining but now
the disagreement payoffs differ due to knowledge transfers. As a joint contract involves investments
in building a relationship, the importer learns aspects of the exporter’s production process. This
information enables the importer to use the production design to make a variety at a (higher) cost,
vcc > τc (or to get some producer at home to mimic the production process). In the event of
a disagreement, the exporter can use the knowledge from her relationship with the importer to
distribute the variety at a (higher) cost, vdd > d. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
disagreement surplus is shared with the other new party. Then the disagreement payoffs are
pidisd =p(qvccd, qˆc, Qˆ)qvccd − Tvccd (10)
pidisc =Tvdd − τcvddqcvdd.
where the disagreement quantities are chosen optimally after the disagreement and the payments
are determined through Nash bargaining. As the disagreement payoffs do not depend on Tcd, the
optimal payment is the solution to
max
Tcd
[
p(qcd, qc, Qˆ)qcd − Tcd − pidisd
]1−β [
Tcd − τcdqcd − pidisc
]β
and is given by
Tˆcd =
[
βpcd(qcd, qc, Qˆ) + (1− β)τcd
]
qcd + (1− β)pidisc − βpidisd . (11)
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2.7.2 Optimal Prices
Substituting for the optimal payments and summing over all importers, the exporter chooses quan-
tities to maximize:
max
qcd,qc
β
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[
p(qcd, qc, Qˆ)− τcd
]
qcddGd.
The exporter chooses to supply to all importers. Importantly, the exporter internalizes the aggregate
effect of quantities on prices (through qc). Thus the business stealing externality is mitigated and
prices are set at the profit-maximizing monopoly levels. The exporter ensures pJcd = τcd/ρ >
pBcd = τcd/η. However, the joint contract price is lower than the price from anonymous markets
(pJ < pM = τcd/ρη) because double marginalization is avoided. The optimal quantity sold to
consumers corresponds to the monopoly quantity in the final goods market and is therefore lower
than the quantity supplied under bilateral contracts. Revenues are also lower but profits are higher.
We summarize this result in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Joint contracts eliminate double marginalization and competition in the final goods
market, leading to pM > pJ > pB.
2.7.3 Entry into Joint Contracts
The pair-specific profit is piJcd = (1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τcd¯/ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
d/d¯
)η/(η−1) and the ex-post
share of profit earned by the exporter is
βJ ≡ β
[
1 + (1− β) vη/(η−1)d − ((1− η) / (1− ρ)) (1− β) (vcρ/ητ)η/(η−1)
]
. (12)
The exporter’s bargaining power rises with her distribution cost advantage (1/vd) and falls with the
learning ability of the importer 1/vc.
Exporters prefer joint contracts to bilateral contracts as long as piJc − fjx ≥ piBc − fbx. Using the
bilateral contracting cutoff condition, the relative cost cutoff for joint contracts is
(zJx/zBx)
ρ/(ρ−1) =
fjx − fbx
fbx − fx
(1− η)η ρ1−ρ /(1− ρ)ρ ρ1−ρ − η1/(1−ρ)/β
βJ/β − (1− η)η
ρ
1−ρ /(1− ρ)ρ ρ1−ρ
≥ 1. (13)
We assume the RHS of this expression is greater than one. Then the highest productivity exporter-
importer pairs choose joint contracts over bilateral contracts.
A fall in trade costs increases the cost cutoff for joint contracts relative to bilateral contracts
because
d ln (zJx/zBx)
d ln τ
=
1− ρ
ρ
βJ
β
1−ρ
1−η
(
η
ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1)
βJ
β
1−ρ
1−η
(
η
ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) − 1 (d lnβJ/d ln τ) < 0. (14)
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Lower trade costs strengthen the bargaining power of exporters because:
dβJ/dτ = − η
1− η
1− η
1− ρ (1− β) (vcρ/ητ)
η/(η−1) τ−1 < 0. (15)
The economic reasoning for this is as follows. A fall in trade costs increases the relative value of
products imported from the exporter. Importers have a lower incentive to reproduce the exporter’s
design and this increases the exporter’s bargaining power under a joint contract. The exporter is
therefore more likely to engage in a joint contract and the relative cost cutoff for joint contracts
rises with trade liberalization. We summarize this result in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Trade liberalization increases the share of varieties supplied through joint contracts
between exporters and importers.
Propositions 2 and 3 provide two implications for contractual choice and pricing. First, after
trade liberalization, we expect to find a rise in the percentage of varieties that are supplied by joint
contracts between exporters and importers. Second, these varieties that undergo a change from
bilateral contracts to joint contracts are sold at relatively higher prices after trade liberalization.
One point is worth emphasizing here. Under CES demand and Pareto cost draws, it is the difference
in the ex-post bargaining power which drives the expansion of varieties under joint contracts. As
long as the outside option under joint versus bilateral contracts is more sensitive to trade costs,
Proposition 3 holds and consumers face higher prices for these varieties after trade liberalization.
Moving away from CES demand, it may be shown that the share of varieties under joint versus
bilateral contracts would increase after trade liberalization even in the absence of knowledge transfers
between exporters and importers. For instance, under linear demand as in Dhingra (2013), trade
liberalization induces a higher percentage increase in profits under joint versus bilateral contracts,
leading to a higher share of varieties under joint contracts. This occurs because the change in profits
is larger for more profitable varieties (even under the same contract) and because the joint contracts
provide firms with more margins of adjustment, leading to bigger responses to trade liberalization.
The result therefore reflects a general economic principle that holds in richer settings. We do not
use a richer variable markup setting because it makes price-setting more complicated and the key
results for prices are less transparent.
Having determined the equilibrium outcomes, we proceed to examining the impact of trade
liberalization on welfare in the next sub-section.
2.8 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
In order to understand the impact of trade liberalization on consumers and firms, we first determine
the impact on the equilibrium consumer price index and profits. Then we discuss the robustness of
these effects under alternative modelling assumptions.
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2.8.1 The Price Index
Prices depend on the nature of contracts between exporters and importers. In particular, the
anonymous market price of variety cd is pMcd = τcd/ρη. Varieties under bilateral contracts are priced
at pBcd = τcd/η. Joint contracts ensure joint profit maximization resulting in p
J
cd = τcd/ρ. Price
of a variety can therefore be written as pVcd = µV τcd where µV is the final markup under contract
V ∈ {M,B, J}. The aggregate price index faced by consumers is P ρ/(ρ−1) = ´ ´ pρ/(ρ−1)ij didj.
Substituting for optimal prices, the price index is
P ρ/(ρ−1) =
∑
V
ˆ
1V (µV cd¯)
ρ/(ρ−1)dGcd¯ + τ
ρ/(ρ−1)∑
V x
ˆ
1V x(µV xcd¯)
ρ/(ρ−1)dGcd¯ V ∈ {M,B, J}
(16)
where 1V is an indicator for contract V . The first term in the price index consists of the prices of
domestic varieties and the second component consists of the prices of imported varieties.
For simplicity, we assume z ≡ cd¯ follows a Pareto distribution G(z) = (z/zmax)k for k(1−ρ)/ρ >
2.7 Though we have not defined the c and d distributions separately, the resulting cd¯ distribution
suffices for getting a familiar price index:
P−k/ε ≡P−k/εhome + P−k/εimport
≡
[
P
−k/ε
M + P
−k/ε
B + P
−k/ε
J
]
+
[
P
−k/ε
Mx + P
−k/ε
Bx + P
−k/ε
Jx
]
where ε(k, ρ, θ) ≡ −k/ (k(ρ− θ)/ρ(θ − 1) + θ/(θ − 1)). The import price index for each contractual
choice is
P
−k/ε
Mx ≡τ−k (fx/f)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
ρ/(ρ−1) κ1κ2µ
ρ/(ρ−1)
Mx
(
1− (zBx/zMx)k+ρ/(ρ−1)
)
P
−k/ε
Bx ≡τ−k (fx/f)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
ρ/(ρ−1) κ1κ2µ
ρ/(ρ−1)
Bx (zBx/zMx)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
(
1− (zJx/zBx)k+ρ/(ρ−1)
)
P
−k/ε
Jx ≡τ−k (fx/f)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
ρ/(ρ−1) κ1κ2µ
ρ/(ρ−1)
Jx (zBx/zMx)
k+ρ/(ρ−1) (zJx/zBx) k+ρ/(ρ−1)
where κ1 ≡ kz−kmax/2 (k + ρ/(ρ− 1)) and κ2 ≡
{
ρη [f/η(1− ρ)](ρ−1)/ρ
}k+ρ/(ρ−1)
for brevity. In
order to explain the role of importers in welfare, we start with the benchmark case where exporters
and importers can only engage in anonymous market transactions. We then discuss the impact of
trade liberalization in a model with richer contracting choices.
2.8.2 The Price Index in Anonymous Markets
When all varieties are supplied through anonymous markets, the aggregate price index is
P
−k/ε
market =κ1κ2 (ρη)
ρ(1−ρ)
[
1 + τ−k (fx/f)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
ρ/(ρ−1)
]
. (17)
7The parametric restriction k(1 − ρ)/ρ > 2 ensures a finite mean for revenues. All results apply to the case of
k(1− ρ)/ρ > 1, except we would need a stronger condition to ensure monotonicity of the contractual choice effect of
trade liberalization on the price index.
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This leads to two key observations. First, we can compare this price index with that from an import
sector of many price-taking importers (η = 1), as shown below.
P/Pprice−takers = (κ2(η)/κ2(1))−ε/k =
(
ηk+ρ/(ρ−1)
)−ε/k
> 1.
As expected, market power in importing increases the level of prices charged to final consumers.
Second, we can also look at the change in the price index with respect to trade costs. The
elasticity of the aggregate price index is d lnP/d ln τ = (Pimport/P )−k/ε (d lnPimport/d ln τ) and the
relevant parameter for this elasticity is
d lnPimport/d ln τ =ε(k, ρ, θ).
The trade elasticity depends on the Pareto shape parameter k for variety costs which includes both
the exporter costs c and the importer costs d. Although the shape parameter includes the importer’s
costs, the comparative static of the price index with respect to trade costs is similar to standard
trade models. The role of importing is confined to double marginalization and market power in
importing does not provide any new channels for trade liberalization to affect the price index.
In the subsequent analysis, we show that departing from anonymous market transactions enables
us to understand how market power in importing affects the price index through the contracting
arrangements between exporters and importers.
2.8.3 The Price Index in the Contracting Choice Model
Under richer contracting, trade liberalization affects the relative cutoff for joint contracts between
exporters and importers (zJx/zBx). This in turn alters the import price index under bilateral
contracts PBx and joint contracts PJx. Solving for changes in these price indices, the percentage
change in the import price index with respect to trade costs is
d lnPimport
d ln τ
=ε
1 +
k + ρ/(ρ− 1)
k
(
(η/ρ)ρ/(1−ρ) − 1
)
P
−k/ε
Jx
P
−k/ε
Mx + P
−k/ε
Bx + P
−k/ε
Jx
d ln (zJx/zBx)
d ln τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Contracting Choice Effect
 . (18)
The first term ε in Equation 18 is the usual negative effect of trade costs on the price index. It
consists of the direct cost-reducing effect of lower trade costs and the change in variety through the
home and import cost cutoffs (zM and zMx). As expected, a fall in trade costs lowers the consumer
price index through its impact on costs and variety. The new term in Equation 18 (in square
brackets) arises from the impact of trade liberalization on the contracting arrangements between
exporters and importers. We refer to this indirect effect of trade liberalization on the price index
as the “contracting choice effect”. From Equation 14, a fall in trade costs increases the cost cutoff
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for cross-border joint contracts (because d ln (zJx/zBx) /d ln τ < 0). As joint contracts entail higher
prices, the contracting choice impact of trade liberalization has the opposite effect on the consumer
price index. We summarize this in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The impact of trade liberalization on the consumer price index consists of: (1)
a negative cost effect through lower trade costs and higher variety, and (2) a positive contracting
choice effect as more exporters engage in joint contracts with their importers.
Proposition 4 leads us to examine the total impact of a reduction in trade costs on the price
index. In the Appendix, we show that the contractual choice effect can dominate the cost effect,
leading to a higher consumer price index after trade liberalization. To understand when this occurs,
it is instructive to consider the case where the fixed costs are small enough for joint contracts to be
viable and when the exporters’ profit share is initially small. As trade costs fall, many exporters
switch from bilateral contracts to joint contracts and this leads to a large contracting choice effect
of trade liberalization.
It can be shown that the magnitude of the contracting choice effect rises with the exporter’s
profit share in joint contracts and falls with the fixed costs of establishing joint contracts. This is
because lower profit shares and higher fixed costs make joint contracts less viable, and lower the
fraction of the price index that comes from varieties under joint contracts. Lower profit shares also
reduce the exporter’s incentive to offer joint contracts instead of bilateral contracts, leading to a
smaller contracting choice effect. We summarize these results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The magnitude of the contracting choice effect rises with the relative profit share
of exporters under joint contracts (βJ/β) and falls with the relative fixed costs of joint contracts
(fjx/fbx).
Proof. See Appendix.
2.8.4 Profits
Having determined the price index, we examine the impact of trade liberalization on the profits
earned by exporters and importers. Let picd denote the sum of profits earned by exporter c and
importer d from selling variety cd. The change in total profits from an imported variety cd is
d lnpicd
d ln τ
= − ρ
1− ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost Effect
+
ρ− θ
(1− ρ) (1− θ)
d lnP
d ln τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate Price Effect
. (19)
As usual, the direct effect of trade liberalization is to reduce costs and increase total profits. The
indirect effect works through the price index. When the price index rises with trade liberalization,
the indirect effect also raises total profits. When the price index falls with trade liberalization, the
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direct effect still dominates but profits rise more slowly. Profit of an incumbent variety is therefore
more sensitive to trade liberalization when there is an industry-wide anti-competitive price effect
(see Appendix for details). The division of profits between exporters and importers depends on the
change in bargaining power. As explained earlier, trade liberalization increases the share of profits
earned by exporters and lowers the share earned by importers in joint contracts. This, however,
does not imply that importers are always worse off. The rise in profits can overwhelm the drop in
bargaining power so that importers are better off. We summarize these results in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Profit from an incumbent variety rises after trade liberalization and exporters in
joint contracts experience a rise in their profit shares.
2.8.5 Alternative Modelling Assumptions
Before proceeding to a test of the contracting choice effect, we briefly discuss the impact of trade
liberalization under alternative assumptions on sequencing and nesting of demand.
Propositions 4 and 6 establish the impact of trade liberalization on welfare and profits when
exporters offer contracts to importers. In settings where importers offer contracts to exporters,
the pricing decisions would be the same under each contract and the impact of trade liberalization
would be similar to the baseline results as long as the contracting costs of exporters are binding.
The baseline model specifies a nesting structure where consumers first choose the make of the
product and then decide where to buy it. For example, a consumer purchasing a small car first de-
cides on buying a Toyota and then decides which car dealer to go to. Toyotas are less substitutable
for Hondas, and car dealers in the area are more substitutable for each other. We discuss how
the impact of trade liberalization on consumer welfare works under alternative nesting and substi-
tutability assumptions. An alternative nesting structure would be where consumers first choose the
distributor and they perceive products of different exporters to be more substitutable for each other.
For example, consumers first walk into a Best Buy store rather than a Walmart store, and then
decide on the computer that they want to buy. They find Acer and Asus to be more substitutable
than buying from a Best Buy or a Walmart store, perhaps due to differences in after-sales services.
In this case, the results of the baseline model hold as long as the contracting costs of exporters are
binding (see Appendix).
Moving to linear demand relaxes the nesting structure and we continue to find similar results
for the price index. Trade liberalization would increase the consumer price index through the
contracting choice effect and increase the share of profits earned by exporters. Under an alternative
scenario where substitutability of the upper nest is greater than substitutability in the lower nest
(η < ρ), exporters would have an incentive to sell more and more, so our setting is not well-defined for
this case. But the logic is consistent with the vertical foreclosure literature in industrial organization
which would imply exporters of perfectly substitutable products have an incentive to obtain higher
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joint profits by vertically integrating with an importer and excluding competing importers.
3 Variety-Level Predictions
Section 2 highlights how market power and contracting choice in importing affect the division of
the gains from trade. Ideally we would test the model by examining how contracts change between
exporters and importers in a period of falling trade costs. Data on contracting choices are not
available in standard datasets. Further, informal arrangements can replicate bilateral contracts
and joint contracts, as discussed earlier. So, we focus on the unique predictions of the model for
observable outcomes - prices, quantities and importer-exporter matches. In this section, we start
by incorporating differences in importer cost cutoffs across exporters. We then provide “difference-
in-difference” predictions for changes in prices, quantities and the number of importers per exporter
under different contracts.
3.1 Contracting Choice Model with Observable Predictions
Continuing with the framework of Section 2, we introduce two features. First, exporters pay fixed
costs to transact with each importer, implying exporters will not supply to less productive importers
who do not generate sufficiently high profits. This leads to an endogenous importer cost cutoff for
each exporter.8 Second, importers can carry the products of multiple exporters, and we find that
more productive importers buy from a larger range of exporters. The rest of the analysis is similar
to Section 2, so we discuss the changes resulting from the theoretical extensions and relegate the
details to a Supplemental Appendix.
Exporters can sell to multiple importers and incur fixed costs (fdx > 0) to transact with each
importer. In this setting, exporters and importers follow the same pricing strategy as earlier.
As importers are monopolistically competitive, they do not account for demand linkages across
exporters (through Q), and their pricing strategy is unchanged. The exporter incurs relationship-
specific fixed costs fdx and chooses a cutoff rule for supplying to importers. Exporter c supplies
to all importers with d ≤ dVmax(c) for V ∈ {M,B, J}. Under anonymous transactions, exporter c
chooses an importer cost cutoff that equates its incremental contribution to variable profits to the
fixed cost of transacting with an additional importer: (mc − c)
(
dxc/dd
M
max(c)
)
= fdx. Importers do
not account for the business stealing impact of their actions under bilateral contracts. Exporters
under bilateral contracts therefore choose an optimal cutoff that equates the profit from the marginal
importer to the relationship-specific fixed cost, TcdBmax−cxcdBmax = fdx. On the other hand, importers
in joint contracts account for the business stealing effect of their actions and this induces a narrower
8Bernard et al. (2014) introduce importer-specific fixed costs in a trade model with heterogeneity of both exporters
and importers. They focus on the implications of variation in importer heterogeneity across destination markets and
do not model contracting choice.
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Figure 1: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Consumer and Import Prices of Varieties
(a) Consumer Prices (b) Import Prices
Note: VV′ - V represents the pre-liberalization contracting relationship, V′ represents the post-liberalization
contracting relationship where V ∈ {M,B, J} and M is anonymous market, B is bilateral private contract,
and J is joint contract.
range of importers,
[
ρ
1−ρ
1−η
η
] [
TcdJmax − cxcdJmax
]
= fdx where the first term in square brackets is less
than one. Substituting for optimal prices and assuming Gd(d) = kddkd−1/dkdmax (for kd > η/(1−η)),
we get explicit solutions for the importer cost cutoff chosen by exporter c under each contract.
These are derived in detail in the Appendix and here we discuss the impact of trade liberalization
on observable outcomes.9
3.2 The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Observable Outcomes
We focus on unique predictions for changes in final prices, import prices, import cost cutoffs and
imported quantities arising from the contracting choice effect of trade liberalization.
3.2.1 Consumer Prices of Imported Varieties
The final price of a variety exported by c and imported by d is pcd = τcdµcd where µcd ∈
{1/ρη, 1/η, 1/ρ} is the final markup for variety cd. The change in final price of variety cd is
∆ ln pcd =∆ ln τ + ∆ lnµcd.
As is well-known, lower trade costs reduce prices directly. The new finding is that the price response
to trade liberalization differs across the contractual choice of exporters and importers. As exporters
and importers switch from bilateral contracts to joint contracts, they increase the final markup
charged to consumers. Exporters and importers moving from anonymous markets to bilateral con-
tracts lower the final markup charged to consumers by overcoming double marginalization. The
change in final prices differs across varieties, as summarized in Figure 1a.
9An alternative assumption for anonymous markets is that exporters do not perceive the aggregate impact of their
actions on consumer prices pc. This would not alter our qualitative results, though the exporter markup and the
optimal cost cutoff for importers would change to mc = c/η and (mc − c)xcdMmax = fdx.
20
Contracting and the Division of the Gains from Trade
Figure 2: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Importer Cutoffs and Quantities of Exporters
(a) Importer Cutoffs (b) Import Quantities
Note: VV′ - V represents the pre-liberalization contracting relationship, V′ represents the post-liberalization
contracting relationship where V ∈ {M,B, J} and M is anonymous market, B is bilateral private contract,
and J is joint contract.
3.2.2 Import Prices of Imported Varieties
The import price paid by the importer to the exporter embodies two crucial aspects of the theoretical
framework. It depends on the final markup charged to consumers and the surplus division between
exporters and importers. Let m˜cd denote the unit “price” paid to exporter c by importer d. In
anonymous markets, it is straightforward to determine the unit price as the importer pays τmcd =
τcd/ρ per unit of the imported product. The unit price under bilateral contracts is the variable
component of the payments to exporters, [β + (1− β)η] τcd/η and similarly the unit price under
joint contracts is [βJ + (1− βJ)ρ] τcd/ρ. Therefore, the unit import price can be written as m˜cd =
τcdµxcd where µ
x
cd is the markup accruing to exporters. The exporter’s markup is 1/ρ in market
transactions, β/η + (1− β) under bilateral contracts and βJ/ρ+ (1− βJ) in joint contracts.
The change in the import price of variety cd is
∆ ln m˜cd =∆ ln τ + ∆ lnµ
x
cd.
Import prices fall due to lower trade costs. Netting out the trade costs, the FOB import price
changes due to a change in the export markup paid by the importer. The export markup µxcd
changes for varieties that switch contracts. Moreover, the export markup also changes for varieties
in joint contracts due to a rise in the bargaining power of exporters. Figure 1b summarizes the
result for the change in import prices across different varieties.
3.2.3 Importer Cost Cutoffs for Exporters
Having incorporated the extensive margin of importers, we can determine the change in the range
of importers chosen by each exporter. Exporters that do not switch contracts still change their
21
Contracting and the Division of the Gains from Trade
importer cost cutoffs on account of industry-wide changes, denoted by the horizontal segments, JJ,
BB, and MM in Figure 2a. Unlike exporters that switch from market to bilateral contracts, these
non-switching exporters only experience a change in industry-wide conditions (from the direct effect
of lower trade costs and the indirect effect of changes in the aggregate price index). Exporters that
switch from market to bilateral contracts earn relatively higher variable profits and increase their
importer range relative to non-switchers. Exporters that switch to joint contracts from bilateral
contracts lower their importer range because they account for the business stealing across their
importers.
3.2.4 Import Quantities of Imported Varieties
Trade liberalization affects the quantity of varieties under each contracting form. Varieties that do
not switch contracts experience a change in quantities purchased by importers only on account of
industry-wide changes in direct trade costs and the indirect aggregate price effect, denoted by the
horizontal segments, JJ, BB, and MM, in Figure 2b. Varieties that switch from market to bilateral
contracts earn relatively higher variable profits and experience an increase in import quantity relative
to non-switchers. Varieties that switch to joint contracts from bilateral contracts experience a
relative drop in import quantity because business stealing is internalized across the importers of the
product.
As import prices and quantities are routinely observed in customs data, we can use the above
predictions to examine the main mechanism of the theory. The main prediction is that import
prices rise after trade liberalization for varieties whose exporters reduce their importer cost cutoffs
and import quantities. The prediction that trade liberalization induces exporters to simultaneously
increase prices, reduce quantities and reduce importers does not arise in standard trade models.
While the possibility of quality upgrading can lead to increased prices after trade liberalization,
there is no clear theoretical prediction in the quality literature on how quantity varies with changes
in quality (e.g. Eckel et al. 2015). Incorporating quality and quantity in different ways, Baller (2013)
shows that standard trade models would predict a rise in quantities when there are economies of
scale in quality upgrading.. Recent models incorporating importer margins of trade also predict that
trade liberalization induces exporters to increase their importer range as a result of higher export
profitability. The range of import partners would rise rather than fall after trade liberalization in
these models. Indeed, this is important because a fall in the number of importers is a direct measure
of our theoretical mechanism that competition falls amongst importers of the product. We therefore
test for the triple prediction of higher prices, lower quantities and fewer importers to isolate the
quality upgrading effect from the contracting effect of trade liberalization. The subsequent section
operationalizes the triple prediction by examining prices, quantities and importer matches following
a major trade liberalization episode in Colombia.
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Figure 3: Colombian Tariffs on US Products in 2011 (Pre-FTA) and 2012 (Post-FTA)
Note: Size of the marker indicates the number of HS8 products.
4 Empirics
The contracting choice effect of trade liberalization increases the probability that an exporter
switches from using bilateral contracts to joint contracts. This implies an increase in the prevalence
of the triple prediction of increased price, reduced quantities and fewer importers for exporters
experiencing trade liberalization. This section examines the empirical relevance of the triple pre-
diction using data on Colombian imports after the implementation of the US-Colombia Free Trade
Agreement (FTA). We start with a discussion of the data , then we present the baseline empir-
ical specification and results. We subsequently examine the robustness of these findings and the
quantitative relevance for price changes after trade liberalization.
4.1 Data
We examine the joint prediction on prices, quantities and matches for imports into Colombia before
and after the implementation of the US-Colombia FTA. Transaction-level import data for Colombia
identifies the exporter and the importer for each import transaction as well as the total value,
quantity, date and product. Aggregating the transaction-level import data to the exporter-product
pair enables us to obtain the average import price of the product, m˜csht, the total quantity of the
product shipped by the exporter to Colombia, Xcsht, and the number of Colombian importers per
exporter-country-product dmaxcsht.
While matched exporter-importer data is available for other countries, the Colombian import
data is unusual because it covers a major trade liberalization with the largest trading partner. The
US-Colombia FTA was implemented on May 15, 2012. The agreement immediately eliminated
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duties on 80 percent of US exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia. Figure 3
shows the Colombian tariff rates charged to the US before and after the US-Colombia FTA. Most
US exports obtain duty-free status after the FTA. Table 1 provides summary statistics for Colombian
tariffs faced by US exporters and a comparable set of exporters from developed countries before
and after the FTA. The pre-FTA tariff for 2011 fell from an average of 11 percentage points to an
average of 4 percentage points in our sample. The tariff elimination was largely on the Colombian
side because 90 percent of US imports from Colombia enjoyed duty free access before the FTA.
The US is Colombia’s leading trade partner and the FTA was a substantial step towards trade
liberalization in Colombia. Between June 2012 and April 2013, US exports to Colombia increased
by 14.2 percent over the same period a year earlier while total Colombian imports were up only 4.6
percent.
Table 1: Colombia Tariffs Before and After the FTA for Exporters in 2009
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Tariffs Charged to US Exporters
Pre-FTA Tariff in 2011 1,750 11.05 5.54 0 35
Post-FTA Tariff in 2012 1,750 4.27 6.37 0 31.5
Tariffs Charged to Non-US Developed Country Exporters
Pre-FTA Tariff in 2011 1,747 6.57 3.52 0 30
Post-FTA Tariff in 2012 1,747 6.82 3.56 0 30
Note: Mean refers to an average across exporters in the sample, weighted by the initial
value of Colombian imports from developed countries for each HS code in 2009.
The theoretical predictions of the model focus on the joint behavior of prices, quantities and
import partners. An exporter, c, increases the import price of its product (m˜c), reduces its total
quantity (Xc ≡
´
xcddGd) and reduces the number of its importers (dmaxc ). We define the triple
prediction as ∆Triplecsht = 1 if exporter c from source country s selling product h at time t increases
its average price across all its importers (4m˜csht > 0) and reduces the total quantity sold to all its
importers (∆Xcsht < 0) and reduces the number of importers of its product (∆dmaxcsht < 0). If any
one of these events does not happen, then ∆Triplecsht = 0.
To test the theoretical results, we need measures of ∆Triplecsht and the treatment variables. We
use Colombian import transactions data recorded by its customs authority, which lists the name of
the importer and the exporter for each import transaction.10 We clean the names by harmonizing
commonly occurring prefixes and suffixes and then aggregating imports to the exporter-country-
product level in each time period (csht). A time period consists of the months from June to
10The raw data come from www.importgenius.com.
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November for each year (2009-2012).11 For each time period, import values and quantities are
recorded at the 8-digit level under the Colombian implementation of Harmonized System (HS)
classification. We compute the average import price (unit value in USD), the total quantity, and
the total number of importers for each exporter-country-product-year, csht. We then compute
∆Triplecsht = 1 for exporter-country-products that have a higher average price, lower total quantity
and fewer importers compared to the previous period.
As customs data are known to be noisy, we work with the set of exporter-country-products
with initial sales of more than US$10,000 and the set of country-product pairs with more than one
exporter in 2009. The theory applies to incumbent exporters, so we focus on exporters who sell
from 2009 to 2012. Pierce and Schott (2012) show that HS codes change over time and this can
lead to estimation bias. To account for this, we work with the set of products with HS codes that
are unchanged between 2009-2012. This covers 84 percent of all products in our sample, alleviating
concerns regarding generality of the results.
To construct the treatment variables, tariff data for the US-Colombia FTA is obtained from the
Office of the US Trade Representative. Tariffs were reduced from their initial levels by one of four
FTA multipliers: 0% of the initial tariff, 80% of the initial tariff, 87% of the initial tariff or 90% of
the initial tariff. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of HS-codes by the FTA tariff multiplier. We
classify Treath = 1 for product codes with a Tariff multiplier equal to zero. For all other product
codes, Treath = 0.
Table 2: US-Colombia FTA Tariff Multipliers for Colombian Non-agricultural Tariffs
Tariff Multiplier # of Products % of Products
0 4,560 76.18
0.80 317 5.30
0.86 52 0.87
0.90 1,057 17.66
Note: Tariff Multiplier = Post-FTA Tariff/ Pre-FTA Tariff. Post-FTA Tariff is the tariff
on a product from the US in the year after the implementation of the FTA
4.2 Baseline Empirical Specification
We examine whether the US-Colombia FTA induced US exporters to increase prices, reduce quanti-
ties and reduce the number of importers in Colombia. To control for underlying trends, we examine
whether exporters from the US selling products that started to receive duty-free access into Colom-
bia were more likely to increase their prices, reduce their quantities and reduce their number of
11 The interval starts in June since the FTA came into force in the middle of May 2012. The period ends in
November since data for December 2011 are missing. We also do not have data for July 2009 and quantities have
been appropriately scaled to account for this. Results are robust to using 2010 as the initial period (available upon
request).
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importers relative to the previous period. We define Postt = 1 for the period after the FTA and
0 for the period before the FTA. In addition, we compare the probabilities for US exporters to a
control group of exporters that did not experience the FTA tariff reduction. We focus on exporters
from developed countries to construct a suitable control group. Accordingly, USAs = 1 for exporters
from the United States and 0 for exporters from any other developed country.
Table 3 summarizes the triple dummy and exporter characteristics for exporters in the control
and the treatment groups separately for 2012. The triple prediction is more prevalent for the
treatment group, but this could be due to differences in product composition or due to other
events specific to the post-FTA time period. In order to minimize these concerns, we proceed to a
difference-in-difference estimation which accounts for product-specific and country-specific effects.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Exporter-Products in 2012
Control Group: Exporter-Products with Treath ·USAs = 0
Variable Obs (csht) Mean S.D. Min Max
∆Triplecsht = 1 5,279 0.047 0.212 0 1
Initial trade valuecsh,2009 ($mn) 5,279 0.175 2.361 0.01 126
Initial number of importerscsh,2009 5,279 1.592 1.300 1 19
Sizecsh 5,105 0.014 0.946 -1.593 6.522
Treatment Group: Exporter-Products with Treath ·USAs = 1
Variable Obs (csht) Mean S.D. Min Max
∆Triplecsht = 1 2,593 0.079 0.270 0 1
Initial trade valuecsh,2009 ($mn) 2,593 0.253 1.695 0.01 60.1
Initial number of importerscsh,2009 2,593 1.949 2.448 1 54
Sizecsh 2,484 0.128 1.039 -1.485 5.911
Note: ∆Triplecsht = 1 if 4ImportPricecsht > 0 & 4ImportQuantitycsht < 0 &
4#Importerscsht < 0 from period t − 1 to t and 0 otherwise. Sizecsh is the z-score
of initial export value ecsh,2009 in 2009 relative to all exporters of the product for all
developed countries in 2009.
We examine the prevalence of simultaneous increases in prices, reductions in quantities and
reductions in the number of importers of an exporter. The estimating equation for the triple
prediction for exporter c from source country s selling product h at time t is a linear probability
model,
∆Triplecsht =β · Postt · Treath ·USAs + γXcsht + αst + αht + εcsht (20)
where εcsht is a disturbance term while αst and αht are source country-year and product-year fixed
effects that account for changes such as exchange rate fluctuations and aggregate demand shocks.
Xcsht includes all interactions between Postt, Treath, and USAs, and other controls such as pre-
trends and their interactions (where Pret = 1 for observations in 2011 and 0 otherwise). The
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coefficient of interest is β which we expect to be positive if the FTA led exporters to consolidate
their import market resulting in higher import prices, lower import quantities and fewer importers.
From the theoretical results in Section 3, we expect the triple prediction to vary across exporters
of different levels of productivity. High productivity exporters are expected to have already paid
the costs of consolidating their import market, so bilateral trade liberalization would lead to consol-
idation in the import markets of less productive exporters from the US. To account for differences
in responses across exporters, we allow the coefficient on Postt ·Treath ·USAs to vary with exporter
size. For each exporter-country-product observation, exporter size is measured by the z-score of the
initial value of sales of the exporter in 2009, relative to all exporters of the product from developed
countries in 2009. Let ecsh,2009 denote the initial value of sales of exporter c from country s of prod-
uct h in 2009. The z-score of initial size is Sizecsh ≡ (ecsh,2009 − µh,2009) /σh,2009 which measures
the initial sales of an exporter relative to exporters of that product from all developed countries.12
Accounting for possible differential responses across firms, the estimating equation is
∆Triplecsht =β · Postt · Treath ·USAs + β1 · Postt · Treath ·USAs · Sizecsh + γXcsht + αst + αht + εcsht
(21)
where Xcsht includes interactions of Sizecsh with Postt, Treath, USAs and Pret as well. Coefficient
β1 allows the impact of the FTA liberalization to vary by initial size of the exporter. We cluster
standard errors for each estimating equation by exporter-country pairs to account for correlation
across time and products within an exporter-country pair.
4.3 Baseline Results
Table 4 summarizes the results from estimation of the linear probability models in Equations 20 and
21. Column (1) shows that exporters who experienced duty-free access from the US-Colombia FTA
are more likely to increase their average price, reduce their total quantities and sell through fewer
importers, relative to a control group of developed country exporters who did not experience duty-
free access for the product. The likelihood of a triple for the treated exporters rises 3.7 percentage
points more after the FTA relative to the change for other exporters.
Column (2) adds the interaction with the initial size of the exporter. From the theory, the sign
of the interaction term is expected to be negative as less productive exporters are more likely to
consolidate their import market after the FTA. The results in Column (2) show that exporters with
smaller initial size are indeed more likely to consolidate their import market. Figure 4 plots the
histogram of the estimated impact of the FTA across all exporters, βˆ0 · Postt · Treath ·USAs + βˆ1 ·
Postt ·Treath ·USAs ·Sizecsh. Most of the exporters from the US have an increase in the probability
of higher prices, lower quantities and fewer partners as a result of the liberalization.
12µh,2009 is the mean of ecsh,2009 across all exporters of product h from developed countries and σh,2009 is the
corresponding standard deviation.
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Table 4: Baseline results: Triple Prediction
Dependent Variable: ∆Triplecsht
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.037** 0.037** 0.097** 0.037**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.049) (0.016)
Pret · Treath ·USAs 0.024 0.024 0.074 0.024
(0.018) (0.017) (0.058) (0.017)
Postt · Treath ·USAs · Sizecsh -0.039** -0.093** -0.039**
(0.017) (0.047) (0.017)
Pret · Treath ·USAs · Sizecsh 0.003 0.016 0.003
(0.017) (0.052) (0.017)
Treath ·USAs -0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.011)
Treath ·USAs · Sizecsh 0.004 0.017 0.004
(0.010) (0.030) (0.010)
Postt · Treath · Sizecsh 0.029** 0.081** 0.029**
(0.012) (0.038) (0.012)
Postt ·USAs · Sizecsh 0.026** 0.057* 0.026**
(0.013) (0.034) (0.013)
Postt · Sizecsh -0.007 -0.029 -0.007
(0.009) (0.027) (0.009)
Treath · Sizecsh -0.009 -0.036 -0.009
(0.008) (0.024) (0.008)
USAs · Sizecsh -0.002 -0.011 -0.002
(0.009) (0.025) (0.009)
Pret · Treath · Sizecsh 0.0004 -0.004 0.001
(0.012) (0.040) (0.013)
Pret ·USAs · Sizecsh -0.010 -0.016 -0.010
(0.014) (0.044) (0.015)
Pret · Sizecsh 0.010 0.028 0.010
(0.011) (0.036) (0.012)
Sizecsh 0.005 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.021) (0.007)
∆MFNht · Sizecsh 0.0001
(0.001)
Product-Year FE αht yes yes yes yes
Country-Year FE αst yes yes yes yes
N 23,616 22,943 7,659 22,922
R2 0.236 0.220 0.355 0.220
Note: Note: ∆Triplecsht = 1 if 4ImportPricecsht > 0 & 4ImportQuantitycsht < 0 &
4#Importerscsht < 0 from period t − 1 to t and 0 otherwise. Treath = 1 for HS-Codes
that received duty-free access from the US-Colombia FTA and 0 otherwise. The sample
covers changes in import outcomes in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Postt = 1 for 2012 and 0
otherwise while Pret = 1 for 2011 and 0 otherwise. USAs = 1 for exporters from the
United States and 0 for exporters from other developed countries. Sizecsh is the z-score of
initial export value ecsh,2009 in 2009 relative to all exporters of the product from developed
countries in 2009. ∆MFNht is the change in MFN tariffs from period t−1 to t. Significance
levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ for 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Estimated Treatment Effects in 2012
Note: Horizontal axis shows the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect.
One shortcoming of measuring consolidation in the import market through the ∆Triplecsht in-
dicator is that it will always be zero for exporters that sell to only one importer in the previous
period. This underestimates the relative prevalence of the triple prediction among the set of ex-
porters that sell to more than one importer initially. Column (3) restricts the estimation sample to
exporter-country-products with more than one import partner initially. As expected, the coefficient
on Postt · Treath ·USAs increases.13
Exporters who gained duty-free access from the FTA are more likely to increase prices, lower
quantities and sell to fewer importers. This effect varies across exporters of different initial size with
smaller exporters more likely to engage in consolidation of their import markets. To examine the
robustness of these predictions, we conduct a series of checks on our results.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The robustness checks in this sub-section can be broadly divided into three types. First, we control
for other explanations such as contemporaneous tariff cuts for trade partners to other developed
countries and quality upgrading to minimize bias in the baseline estimates from omitted variables.
Second, we look at a discrete measure of initial size and examine how key coefficients vary across
exporters in different size categories. Finally, we examine whether the triple prediction continues
13Another concern might be that the higher prevalence of the triple prediction could be due to an increase in the
variance of price changes, quantity changes and changes in the number of importers. While increases in the variances
of these outcomes is consistent with the theory, we also re-estimated the regressions controlling for changes in the
variances. The main results are unchanged but our sample is smaller because computing changes in variances for the
US and other developed countries separately is more demanding on the data (available upon request).
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to hold when we look within exporter-importer pairs.
4.4.1 Multilateral tariff cuts
The time period that we study also includes a unilateral tariff reform in Colombia that reduced
the average tariff from 12.2 percent to 8.2 percent on November 5 2010 (WTO 2012). The stated
aim of this tariff reform was to reduce the dispersion in tariffs and eliminate the negative effective
protection that existed in some industries. The reform reduced most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs
on a subset of products. For products in our sample, the average MFN duty was 10.3 percentage
points before the reform which fell by 1.3 percentage points. To account for unilateral changes in
Colombia’s MFN tariffs, Column (4) of Table 4 includes an interaction between the change in MFN
tariffs and initial size of the exporter. As the MFN tariff change applies to all trade partners with
MFN status, the effect of ∆MFNht is subsumed in the product-time fixed effects αht. Column (3)
shows that the main findings of Columns (1) and (2) are unaffected, and the interaction between
MFN tariff changes and initial size is small and statistically insignificant for the triple prediction.
4.4.2 Revenue Predictions
Increases in unit values following a trade liberalization are often interpreted as quality upgrading
by exporters (Verhoogen 2008; Khandelwal 2010). Colombia is a small country relative to other
destinations of US exporters, making it less likely that the unit values pick up investments in quality
upgrading of US exporters following duty-free access to the Colombian market. In fact, lower trade
costs would make it more likely for lower quality US exporters to be able to sell to the Colombian
market. To ensure however that our results are not driven by quality increases, we always examine
the triple prediction where price rises are accompanied by a decline in total quantity and in the
number of importers of the exporter (which is a direct measure of reduced competition among
importers). We therefore consider another triple prediction which looks at a decline in total revenue
rather than total quantity of the exporter.14
The variety-level model of Section 3 predicts that exporters who switch from bilateral contracts
to joint contracts increase their profits but sell lower quantities to fewer importers. An extreme
prediction of the model is that these exporters might also lower their sales values to earn higher
profit margins per unit. In the Appendix, we discuss that this arises under certain conditions on
parameter values and therefore it is an extreme prediction of the model which need not arise for all
the firms that switch from bilateral to joint contracts. The main intuition here is that under joint
contracts, the firm need not sell many units of the product if the markup is large and the fixed costs
of joint versus bilateral contracts are relatively low. So if we find that US exporters are more likely
to reduce revenues when they increase prices and sell to fewer importers, it would be another piece
14We are grateful to Penny Goldberg and Marc Melitz for pointing us in this direction.
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of evidence that duty-free access induced exporters to increase markups rather than quality.
Table 5: Estimation results: Revenue-Based Triple Prediction
Dependent Variable: ∆TripleRevenuecsht
(1) (2)
Coef. Coef.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.)
Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.029** 0.030**
(0.014) (0.014)
Postt · Treath ·USAs · Sizecsh -0.040**
(0.014)
Controls yes yes
Product-Year FE αht yes yes
Country-Year FE αst yes yes
N 23,616 22,943
R2 0.245 0.228
Note: Note: ∆TripleRevenuecsht = 1 if 4ImportPricecsht > 0 & 4ImportRevenuecsht < 0 &
4#Importerscsht < 0 from period t−1 to t and 0 otherwise. Treath = 1 for HS-Codes that
received duty-free access from the US-Colombia FTA and 0 otherwise. The sample covers
changes in import outcomes in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Postt = 1 for 2012 and 0 otherwise
while Pret = 1 for 2011 and 0 otherwise. USAs = 1 for exporters from the United States
and 0 for exporters from other developed countries. Sizecsh is the z-score of initial export
value ecsh,2009 in 2009 relative to all exporters of the product from developed countries
in 2009. Controls include all interactions between Postt, Treath, USAs, Sizecsh and Pret.
Significance levels are indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ for 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
We examine the revenue-based triple prediction of higher prices, lower revenues and fewer im-
porters in a way similar to the baseline analysis. Specifically, ∆TripleRevenuecsht = 1 if exporter c
from source country s selling product h at time t increases its average price across all its importers
(4m˜csht > 0) and reduces the total revenue received from all its importers and reduces the num-
ber of importers of its product (dmaxcsht < 0). If any one of these events does not happen, then
∆TripleRevenuecsht = 0. As in the baseline results, Table 5 shows US exporters who receive duty-free
access are more likely to have higher prices, lower revenues and fewer importers, and these exporters
tend to be the smaller exporters. As expected, the increased likelihood of the revenue-based triple
prediction is 3%, which is smaller than the 4% increased likelihood of the quantity-based triple
prediction in the baseline analysis.15
4.4.3 Size Bins
Instead of using a continuous measure of initial size, we can also estimate different coefficients for
exporters by their size category. We divide all exporters of a product into three different terciles of
15The main results are similar when we only use a double prediction of lower revenue and fewer importers on the
LHS (available upon request).
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Sizecsh and estimate separate coefficients on Postt · Treath · USAs for each tercile. Tercile1csh = 1
if exporter c’s initial size measured by Sizecsh is below the 33rd percentile of all exporters of that
product from developed countries, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Tercile2csh = 1 if c’s initial size is
between the 33rd and 66th percentile, and Tercile3csh = 1 if c’s initial size is greater than the 66th
percentile for exporters of that product. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the triple prediction
continues to hold and it is the smaller exporters in the first and second terciles that increase their
prices, reduce quantities and reduce their number of importers.
Table 6: Tercile results: Triple Prediction by Size Bins
Dependent Variable: ∆Triplecsht
(1) (2)
Coef. Coef.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.)
Tercile3csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs -0.014 -0.021
(0.026) (0.022)
Tercile2csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.053* 0.043*
(0.028) (0.024)
Tercile1csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.086*** 0.077***
(0.029) (0.027)
Tinycsh · Postt · Treath ·USAs -0.067
(0.028)
Controls yes yes
Product-Year FE αht yes yes
Country-Year FE αst yes yes
N 23,616 71,316
R2 0.238 0.121
Note: Note: ∆Triplecsht = 1 if 4ImportPricecsht > 0 & 4ImportQuantitycsht < 0 &
4#Importerscsht < 0 from period t − 1 to t and 0 otherwise. Treath = 1 for HS-Codes
that received duty-free access from the US-Colombia FTA and 0 otherwise. The sample
covers changes in import outcomes in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Postt = 1 for 2012 and 0
otherwise while Pret = 1 for 2011 and 0 otherwise. USAs = 1 for exporters from the
United States and 0 for exporters from other developed countries. Sizecsh is the z-score of
initial export value ecsh,2009 in 2009 relative to all exporters of the product from developed
countries in 2009. Tercile1csh = 1 for the 33rd tercile of Sizecsh, Tercile2csh = 1 for the
66th tercile and Tercile3csh = 1 for the top tercile. Tinycsh = 1 for all exporters from
developed countries with total sales of less than USD10,000 in 2009. Controls include
all interactions between Postt, Treath, USAs, Pret and indicators for initial size tercile
in Column (1) and also interactions with Tinycsh in Column (2). Significance levels are
indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ for 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
It should be noted however that the set of exporter-country-products that we considered through-
out are those with initial sales greater than US$10,000. The results are robust to inclusion of tiny
exporters that earn below US$10,000 in 2009 (Tinycsh = 1ecsh,2009≤10000). Column (2) adds in the
tiny exporters. We continue to find that the medium-sized exporters in terciles 1 and 2 are the ones
that are more likely to increase prices, lower quantities and reduce their number of importers. The
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coefficient on the second tercile is less precisely estimated, but we can be confident of the positive
coefficient on the first tercile. These findings suggest that the triple prediction holds precisely for
the medium-sized US exporters, as expected from the theory.
4.4.4 Within-Exporter-Importer Pairs
While the baseline results examine the triple prediction at the level of the exporter, the model
predicts that the results should also hold when we look within an exporter-importer pair. Let d
denote a Colombian importer that imports from exporter c. The triple variable is now defined as
∆Triplecdsht = 1 for exporter-importer pairs cd that experience an increase in their bilateral price
(∆mcdsht > 0), a fall in their bilateral quantity (∆xcdsht < 0) and a decrease in the importers that
buy from c (∆dmaxcsht < 0). If any one of these events does not happen, then ∆Triplecdsht = 0.
Table 7: Tercile results: Within Exporter-Importer Triple Prediction by Size Bins
Dependent Variable: ∆Triplecdsht
(1) (2)
Coef. Coef.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.)
Tercile3csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs -0.004 -0.005
(0.028) (0.025)
Tercile2csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.037 0.046*
(0.030) (0.028)
Tercile1csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.054* 0.053**
(0.029) (0.026)
Tinycsh · Postt · Treath ·USAs -0.0414
(0.028)
Controls yes yes
Product-Year FE αht yes yes
Country-Year FE αst yes yes
N 32,158 82,130
R2 0.183 0.110
Note: Note: ∆Triplecdsht = 1 if 4ImportPricecdsht > 0 & 4ImportQuantitycdsht < 0 &
4#Importerscsht < 0 from period t − 1 to t and 0 otherwise. Treath = 1 for HS-Codes
that received duty-free access from the US-Colombia FTA and 0 otherwise. The sample
covers changes in import outcomes in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Postt = 1 for 2012 and 0
otherwise while Pret = 1 for 2011 and 0 otherwise. USAs = 1 for exporters from the
United States and 0 for exporters from other developed countries. Sizecsh is the z-score of
initial export value ecsh,2009 in 2009 relative to all exporters of the product from developed
countries in 2009. Tercile1csh = 1 for the 33rd tercile of Sizecsh, Tercile2csh = 1 for the
66th tercile and Tercile3csh = 1 for the top tercile. Tinycsh = 1 for all exporters from
developed countries with total sales of less than USD10,000 in 2009. Controls include
all interactions between Postt, Treath, USAs, Pret and indicators for initial size tercile
in Column (1) and also interactions with Tinycsh in Column (2). Significance levels are
indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ for 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
Column (1) of Table 7 shows that the first tercile of exporters by initial size is more likely to see
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the triple prediction hold at the exporter-importer level. Adding the tiny exporters to the sample,
Column (2) shows the triple prediction continues to hold and the positive coefficient on the second
tercile is more precisely estimated. The results of Table 7 which is at the exporter-importer level
conform broadly with the results of Table 6 which is at the level of the exporter. US exporters in
the first and second terciles (with initial revenues greater than USD10,000) are more likely to show
higher prices, lower quantities and fewer importers.
4.5 Price Regressions
An advantage of testing the model with the triple prediction is that it lets us examine a unique
prediction which does not arise in standard models. For instance, if instead we look only at an
increase in prices, it might reflect an increase in the quality of the product. A limitation of the
triple prediction however is that it does not let us put a number on the price increases faced by the
importers. To get a sense of the magnitude of the changes, we examine how unit values respond to
duty-free access to the Colombian market.
Using a specification similar to the baseline, we regress changes in unit values to determine
the coefficient on Postt · Treath · USAs for each tercile of US exporters. The dependent variable
in Column (1) of Table 8 is the change in the average price charged by exporter c for product h
(∆ ln m˜csht). We find that exporters in the first tercile of initial size increase their average unit
value by 30% more when they experience duty-free access to the Colombian market, relative to the
control group of exporters from developed countries that do not receive duty-free access. Column
(2) reports the regression of changes in unit values with tiny exporters included in the sample to
show that the result is not driven by selection that harms smaller exporters.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 look even more closely at the change in unit values by conducting
the analysis at the exporter-importer level. The dependent variable is the change in the price charged
by exporter c to importer d for product h (∆ lnmcdsht). Exporters in the first tercile that experience
duty-free access to the Colombian market increase the unit value that they charge to an importer
by 25% more. These estimates show that the price elasticities with respect to duty-free access are
quantitatively important.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines how the behavior of importers and their interaction with exporters affect the
division of the gains from trade among consumers, importers and exporters. When an exporter sells
a product to importers through anonymous markets, double marginalization and business stealing
among competing importers lead to lower profits. Exporters and importers can invest in richer
contractual arrangements to overcome these sources of lower profits.
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Table 8: Unit value results: Changes in Exporter-level Prices and Exporter-Importer-Level Prices
Exporter-level Exporter-Importer
∆ ln m˜csht ∆ lnmcdsht
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Tercile3csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs -0.114 -0.025 -0.154* -0.124
(0.121) (0.104) (0.091) (0.080)
Tercile2csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.074 0.084* -0.143 -0.130
(0.148) (0.133) (0.118) (0.112)
Tercile1csh · Postt · Treath ·USAs 0.303** 0.314** 0.228* 0.254**
(0.152) (0.139) (0.123) (0.115)
Tinycsh · Postt · Treath ·USAs -0.353** -0.256**
(0.149) (0.123)
Controls yes yes yes yes
Product-Year FE αht yes yes yes yes
Country-Year FE αst yes yes yes yes
N 23,616 71,316 32,158 82,130
R2 0.189 0.089 0.162 0.084
Note: Note: ∆ ln m˜csht is the log change in the exporter-level average unit value and
∆ lnmcdsht is the log change in the exporter-importer-level unit value. Treath = 1 for HS-
Codes that received duty-free access from the US-Colombia FTA and 0 otherwise. The
sample covers changes in import outcomes in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Postt = 1 for 2012 and
0 otherwise while Pret = 1 for 2011 and 0 otherwise. USAs = 1 for exporters from the
United States and 0 for exporters from other developed countries. Sizecsh is the z-score of
initial export value ecsh,2009 in 2009 relative to all exporters of the product from developed
countries in 2009. Tercile1csh = 1 for the 33rd tercile of Sizecsh, Tercile2csh = 1 for the
66th tercile and Tercile3csh = 1 for the top tercile. Tinycsh = 1 for all exporters from
developed countries with total sales of less than USD10,000 in 2009. Controls include
all interactions between Postt, Treath, USAs, Pret and indicators for initial size tercile
in Column (1) and also interactions with Tinycsh in Column (2). Significance levels are
indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ for 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
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We embed the choice of contracts between exporters and importers into a trade model with
heterogeneous exporters and importers. Exporters can offer bilateral contracts that eliminate dou-
ble marginalization, leading to higher profits and lower prices. Exporters can internalize business
stealing across importers by investing in joint contracts. This enables an exporter to commit to
mitigating competition among its importers allowing total profit from the product to rise at the
expense of consumer welfare. When investments in joint contracts embody knowledge of the ex-
porter’s product, trade liberalization changes the relative incentives to engage in bilateral contracts
and joint contracts. Lower trade costs strengthen the bargaining power of exporters and make them
more likely to offer joint contracts. We show that the price increase from this move towards joint
contracts can dominate the standard consumer gains from trade, leading to a rise in the consumer
price index after trade liberalization.
The model enables us to derive unique predictions for changes in import prices, quantities
and the number of importers per exporter. Testing these implications empirically, we show that
bilateral trade liberalization between Colombia and the US induced US exporters to consolidate their
import market, increasing the probability of higher prices, reduced quantity and fewer Colombian
importers per exporter. These observable predictions suggest that the actions of exporters and
importers affect the ability of consumers to gain from trade. The estimated elasticity of import
prices with respect to trade costs shows substantial increases in prices for certain products from trade
liberalization. Future work can shed more light on how this translates into consumer price changes
and its contribution to the aggregate pass-through of reduction in trade barriers into consumer
prices.
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Appendix
The Impact of Trade Liberalization on the Price Index
We are interested in understanding how the price index changes with trade liberalization. Substi-
tuting for the optimal markups, the import price index is
P
−k/ε
import/κ1κ2 =τ
−k (fx/f)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
ρ/(ρ−1) [(ρη)ρ/(1−ρ) +
(
ηρ/(1−ρ) − (ρη)ρ/(1−ρ)
)( zBx
zMx
)k+ρ/(ρ−1)
+
(
ρρ/(1−ρ) − ηρ/(1−ρ)
)( zJx
zMx
)k+ρ/(ρ−1)
].
Differentiating the import price index with respect to trade cost τ, the import price index elasticity
is
d lnPimport
d ln τ
==ε
1−
k + ρρ−1
k
(
η
ρ
1−ρ − ρ ρ1−ρ
)(
zJx
zMx
)k+ ρ
ρ−1 1−ρ1−η (1−β)( vcτ )
ρ
ρ−1
βJV
β
1−ρ
1−η
(
η
ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1)−1
(ρη)
ρ
1−ρ +
(
η
ρ
1−ρ − (ρη) ρ1−ρ
)(
zBx
zMx
)k+ ρ
ρ−1
+
(
ρ
ρ
1−ρ − η ρ1−ρ
)(
zJx
zMx
)k+ ρ
ρ−1

The direct cost effect and the indirect contracting choice effect move in opposite directions. We
therefore need to determine the relative magnitude of the contracting choice effect, and will show
that it can overwhelm the cost effect for appropriate parameter values.
To show that the import price index change can be negative, consider the simple case where
the fixed costs of anonymous market transactions are similar to those of bilateral contracts. In
this case (e.g. fx = fbx), the profit from anonymous transactions is smaller than from bilateral
contracts and no exporter-importer pair chooses to operate through anonymous transactions. We
will show that the change in the price index can be negative for appropriate parameter values.
Two key assumptions on parameter values are βJ ∈ [0, 1] and zJx/zBx ≤ 1. As βJ/β = 1 + (1 −
β)v
η/(η−1)
d
[
1− ((1− η)/(1− ρ)) (ρvc/ητvd)η/(η−1)
]
, these assumptions imply the importing cost
disadvantage of producers must satisfy:
v
η
η−1
d ∈
[
1− η
1− ρ
(
ρvc
ητ
) η
η−1
−
(
1− 1− η
1− ρ
(
η
ρ
) ρ
1−ρ
)
/(1− β),
(
ρvc
ητ
) η
η−1
+ 1/β
]
. (22)
The upper bound follows from βJ ≤ 1 and the lower bound follows from zJx/zBx ≤ 1 (which ensures
a stricter constraint than βJ ≥ 0).16
With the parameter restrictions in hand, we can proceed to showing that the import price index
can rise with trade liberalization. The import price index is
P
−k/ε
import/κ1κ2 =τ
−k (fbx/fb)
k+ρ/(ρ−1)
ρ/(ρ−1)
[
ηρ/(1−ρ) −
(
ηρ/(1−ρ) − ρρ/(1−ρ)
)( zJx
zBx
)k+ρ/(ρ−1)]
.
16Note that 1−η
1−ρ
(
η
ρ
) ρ
1−ρ ≤ 1 for η > ρ so the lower bound is strictly less than (ρvc/ητ)η/(η−1).
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Substituting for the price index and the change in zJx/zBx, the import price elasticity is
d lnPimport
d ln τ
=ε
1− η/(1− η)
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k + ρρ−1
k

(
η
ρ
1−ρ − ρ ρ1−ρ
)(
zJx
zBx
)k+ ρ
ρ−1
η
ρ
1−ρ −
(
η
ρ
1−ρ − ρ ρ1−ρ
)(
zJx
zBx
)k+ ρ
ρ−1
1−β
β
(
vcρ
τη
) η
η−1
(
η
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
βJ
β
1−ρ
1−η
(
η
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1 − 1


Let the inverse of the second term in parenthesis be defined as
S ≡
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We will show that S can be zero for appropriate parameter values. Suppose fjx/fbx takes a value such
that fjx/fbx− 1 = α
[
βJ
β
1−ρ
1−η
(
ρ
η
) ρ
1−ρ − 1
]
for α ≥ 1. Then the relative cutoff is zJx/zBx = 1/α ≤ 1
and it stays the same as vη/(η−1)d approaches its lower bound. Therefore, as v
η/(η−1)
d approaches its
lower bound, the first term of S is η
ρ
1−ρα
k+ ρ
ρ−1 /
(
η
ρ
1−ρ − ρ ρ1−ρ
)
−1 > 0 and the second term is zero.
Finally, we need to confirm that the disagreement payoffs are never chosen in equilibrium. These
two conditions imply the importing cost disadvantage must satisfy:
βv
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η−1
d ≤ 1− (1− β)
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) η
η−1
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At the lower bound of vη/(η−1)d =
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Therefore, S goes to zero and the contracting choice effect gets arbitrarily large, ensuring the import
price elasticity is negative.
Monotonicity of the Contracting Choice Effect
From the expression for the contracting choice effect, we see that the magnitude rises with zJx/zBx.
As the relative cutoff in turn falls with fjx/fbx, the magnitude of the contracting choice effect falls
with fjx/fbx. On the other hand, the relative cutoff rises with βJ/β (or v
η/(η−1)
d ). However, the
elasticity of the relative cutoff falls with βJ/β and dominates the relative cutoff rise for k(1−ρ)/ρ >
2. Therefore, the magnitude of the contracting choice effect falls with fjx/fbx and rises with βJ/β.
B Incumbent Profit
The change in profit of cd is
d lnpicd
d ln τ
=
ρ
ρ− 1
[
1− ρ− θ
ρ (1− θ)
P
−k/ε
import
P−k/ε
d lnPimport
d ln τ
]
.
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When import prices rise with trade liberalization (d lnPimport/d ln τ < 0), the anti-competitive effect
raises variety profits further and d lnpicd/d ln τ < 0. When import prices fall with trade liberalization
(d lnP/d ln τ > 0), the pro-competitive effect exerts downward pressure on profits. As the direct cost
effect and the aggregate price effect move in opposite directions, we need to determine the relative
magnitudes of these two effects. Since the contracting choice effect is negative, d lnPimport/d ln τ ≤
ε from the earlier derivation of the import price elasticity. The import price elasticity is ε =
k/
(
k ρ−θρ(1−θ) +
θ
1−θ
)
. As ρ−θρ(1−θ)ε =
k ρ−θ
ρ(1−θ)
k ρ−θ
ρ(1−θ)+
θ
1−θ
≤ 1 and P−k/εimport/P−k/ε ≤ 1, we conclude that the
aggregate price effect cannot exceed one and d lnpicd/d ln τ is negative for d lnP/d ln τ > 0. Further,
|d lnpicd/d ln τ |d lnP/d ln τ<0 > |d lnpicd/d ln τ |d lnP/d ln τ>0 and profits are more sensitive when the
price index rises with trade liberalization.
C Variety-Level Model
This section explains the variety-level predictions in a model with relationship-specific cost fdx > 0,
ad-valorem trade costs τa > 1 and importers who purchase products of many exporters.
Prices of Imported Varieties
In anonymous markets, importer d pays exporter c a unit price of τaτmcdqcd = τaτcdqcd/ρ = ηpcdqcd.
Under bilateral contracts, τaTcd = [β + (1− β)η] pcdqcd+(1−β)τafdx and in joint contracts, τaTcd =
[βJ + (1− βJ)ρ] pcdqcd+ (1−β)τafdx. The “import price” can be defined as the variable component
of the payments made to exporters. Then the import price under each contract is m˜Vcd = µ
xV
cd τaτcd
where µxVcd ∈ {1/ρ, β/η + (1 − β), βJ/ρ + (1 − βJ)} for V ∈ {M,B, J} respectively. The ranking
of the import prices (and hence also the average FOB import price) is m˜Mcd > m˜
J
cd > m˜
B
cd where
the second inequality is implied by βJ/β ≥ (1− η) (η/ρ)ρ/(1−ρ) /(1− ρ) which guarantees a higher
productivity cutoff for joint contracts versus bilateral contracts in the denominator of Equation 13.
Importer Cutoff of Exporters
The ratio of importer cutoffs under joint contracts and bilateral contracts for exporter c is
(
dJmax(c)/d
B
max(c)
)kd− ρ1−ρ 1−ηη (kd+ ηη−1) = (ρ/η)1/(1−ρ) < 1.
The ratio of importer cutoffs under bilateral contracts and anonymous markets for exporter c is
(
dBmax(c)/d
M
max(c)
)kd− ρ1−ρ 1−ηη (kd+ ηη−1) =ρ−1/(1−ρ) > 1.
Quantities of Imported Varieties
The optimal import quantity of a variety under vertical contract V is xVcd = τdq
V
cd and the total
quantity supplied by c is xVc =
´ dVmax(c)
0 τdq
V
cddGd = c
−1 η
1−η
kd
kd+η/(η−1)fd
(
dVmax(c)/dmax
)kd . Since
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dMmax(c) < d
B
max(c) and dBmax(c) > dJmax(c), the total quantity for exporters follows the same ranking
as their importer cost cutoffs.
Import Revenues of Exporters
The total revenue of exporter c under a contract V is the sum of its price times quantity across all
importers, rVc =
´ dVmax(c)
dVmin(c)
mVcdx
V
cddGd. The ratios of revenues earned by exporter c under bilateral
contracts relative to the market and under joint contracts relative to bilateral contracts are as
follows:
rBc /r
M
c =
β(1− η)/η + 1
1/ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
(
dBmax(c)
dMmax(c)
)k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
=
β(1− η)/η + 1
1/ρ
ρ
− kd/(1−ρ)
kd(1− 1−ηη
ρ
1−ρ)+ρ/(1−ρ) ≥ 1
rJc /r
B
c =
βJ(1− ρ)/ρ+ 1
β(1− η)/η + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
(
dJmax(c)
dBmax(c)
)k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
=
βJ(1− ρ)/ρ+ 1
β(1− η)/η + 1 (ρ/η)
kd/(1−ρ)
kd(1− 1−ηη
ρ
1−ρ)+ρ/(1−ρ)
The inequality for the first ratio follows directly from the parameter values. Revenues under bilateral
contracts are higher because of higher sales to more importers. The second ratio is ambiguous as
the first term is the markup ratio which is greater than one and the second term is the cutoff ratio
which is less than one. The RHS of the second ratio however is constrained by the assumption of
the viability of joint contracts. We show that even taking the underlying assumptions for viability
into account, the revenue ratio can range from less than one to greater than one, so that an extreme
result of the model is that exporters who switch from bilateral to joint contracts lower their sales
values. This can be most clearly illustrated for the case of kd + η/(η − 1) close to zero which
corresponds to the model of Section 2.
Then the revenue ratio is rJc /rBc =
βJ (1/ρ−1)+1
β(1/η−1)+1
(
ρ
η
)1/(1−ρ)
and the viability condition for joint
contracts is
βJ
β
1/ρ− 1
1/η − 1 ≤
(
η
ρ
)1/(1−ρ) [(fjx − fbx
fbx − fx
)(
1− (1− ρ)ρρ/(1−ρ)/β(1/η − 1)
)
+ 1
]
.
This condition implies
rJc /r
B
c ≤ 1 +
(
β(1/η − 1)− (1− ρ)ρρ/(1−ρ)) (fjx − fbx) / (fbx − fx) + (ρ/η)1/(1−ρ) − 1
β(1/η − 1) + 1
The second term on the RHS is increasing in β(1/η − 1) and the upper bound for the second term
is given by the viability condition for bilateral contracts versus markets, β(1/η − 1) ≤ fbx(1 −
ρ)ρρ/(1−ρ)/fx. Substituting for this upper bound, the model constrains the revenue ratio to be
rJc /r
B
c ≤ 1 +
(1− ρ)ρρ/(1−ρ) (fjx − fbx) /fx + (ρ/η)1/(1−ρ) − 1
fbx(1− ρ)ρρ/(1−ρ)/fx + 1
.
The RHS is less than one for small differences in the fixed costs of joint versus bilateral costs and
greater than one otherwise.
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C Alternative Nesting and Substitutability
Consumers choose the distributor they buy from and then decide on the manufacturers’ products
that the distributor stocks. The demand for variety c of distributor d is
qcd = p
1/(η−1)
cd p
(η−ρ)/(η−1)(ρ−1)
d P
(ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
for pη/(η−1)d ≡
´
p
η/(η−1)
cd dGc and P
ρ/(ρ−1) ≡ ´ pρ/(ρ−1)d dGd. The exporter now charges mc = c/η
under anonymous markets and the final price is pMcd = τaτcd/ρη (even though the markups charged
by the exporters and importers are different from Section 2). Moving to bilateral contracts wipes out
double marginalization and the markups charged by importers fall because the bilateral contracts
do not account for the price index of the importer pd. The final price is pBcd = τaτcd/η under
bilateral contracts and pJcd = τaτcd/ρ under joint contracts. Assuming a Pareto distribution for
exporter costs and relationship-specific costs fcx > 0, the optimal manufacturer cost cutoff cmax(d)
for distributor d and the profits can be derived in a manner similar to the baseline model. As long
as the exporter’s costs of joint contracts are binding, the reasoning for more joint contracts after
trade liberalization is as before.
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6 Supplemental Material: Not for publication
This Appendix derives the equilibrium outcomes in a model with relationship-specific cost fdx > 0,
ad-valorem trade costs τa > 1 and importers who purchase products of many exporters. We start
with determining the profits of exporters and importers under each vertical contract, and then
determine the exporter cutoffs of importers.
Anonymous Market Transactions
Importer d chooses his quantity qcd to maximize the following profit function:
max
qcd
piMd =
(
p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)− τaτmcd
)
qcd.
The optimal price chosen by d is pcd = τaτmcd/η. Exporter c observes her demand from all
importers, and chooses the market price mc and the importer cost cutoff to maximize profits
maxpiMc =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[(mc − c)xcd − fdx] dGd.
As earlier, the optimal import price is mc = c/ρ implying the final price is pcd = τaτcd/ρη.
However, the exporter incurs relationship-specific fixed costs fdx and must decide the cost cutoff
for her importers. Substituting for the optimal import price, exporter c earns
piMc = τ
−1
a η(1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/ρη
)ρ/(ρ−1) − ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
fdxdGd.
Under Pareto cost draws,
(
d¯/dmax
)η/(η−1)
=
´ dMmax(c)
0 d
η/(η−1)dGd =
(
kd
kd+η/(η−1)
) (
dMmax(c)/dmax
)kd+η/(η−1).
Exporter c supplies to all importers with d ≤ dMmax(c) where the cutoff at the optimal mc is given
by
(mc − c)xc
[
(kd + η/(η − 1)) 1− η
η
ρ
1− ρ
]
= fdxkd
(
dMmax(c)/dmax
)kd .
The cost cutoff of viable importers is
(
dMmax(c)
dmax
)kd− ρ1−ρ 1−ηη (kd+ ηη−1)
=
(
kd
kd +
η
η−1
) 1−η
η
ρ
1−ρ−1 1− η
η
ρ
1− ρ
η(1− ρ)
fdx
τ−1a P
ρ−θ
(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcdmax
ρη
) ρ
ρ−1
.
The profit function of exporter c net of fixed costs is
piMc =
(
kd
kd + η/(η − 1)
1− η
η
ρ
1− ρ − 1
)
fdx
(
dMmax(c)/dmax
)kd .
An exporter can operate in the market as long as piMc ≥ fx. For d lnP/d ln τ ≤ 1, the cost
cutoff for exporters who prefer to operate rather than exit rises with trade liberalization because
d ln cMx/d ln τ = − ρ1−ρ
[
1− ρ−θρ(1−θ)d lnP/d ln τ
]
.
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Bilateral Private Contracts
Under bilateral contracts, importer d’s profit function from selling exporter c’s variety is
picd(d) =p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)qcd − τaTcd.
The exporter’s profit from selling to all importers is
piBc =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[
piBcd(c)− fdx
]
dGd =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[Tcd − τcdqcd − fdx] dGd.
Bilateral Nash bargaining implies the optimal payment is
τaTˆcd =
[
βp(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ) + (1− β)τaτcd
]
qcd + τa(1− β)fdx.
Substituting for the optimal payments into the exporter’s problem, c chooses quantities to maximize:
max
q
piBc =β
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[
τ−1a
(
p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)− τaτcd
)
qcd − fdx
]
dGd.
As earlier, pB = τaτcd/η and the exporter finds it optimal to sell to all importers with
τ−1a
(
p(qcd, qˆc, Qˆ)− τaτcd
)
qcd ≥ fdx. The cost cutoff for importers of exporter c is dBmax(c) which
is defined as
(1− η)τ−1a P
ρ−θ
(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/η
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
dBmax(c)/d¯
)η/(η−1)
= fdx.
Under Pareto cost draws for importers, exporter c finds it viable to offer bilateral contracts to
importers with cost draws below dBmax(c) such that(
dBmax(c)
dmax
)kd− ρ1−ρ 1−ηη (kd+ ηη−1)
=
(
kd
kd +
η
η−1
) 1−η
η
ρ
1−ρ−1 1− η
fdx
τ−1a P
ρ−θ
(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcdmax
η
) ρ
ρ−1
.
Exporter c’s profit under bilateral contracts is
piBc = β
(
kd
kd + η/(η − 1) − 1
)
fdx
(
dBmax(c)/dmax
)kd
Exporter prefers bilateral contracts to anonymous transactions as long as piBc −piMc ≥ fBx− fx. For
d lnP/d ln τ ≤ 1, the cost cutoff for exporters who prefer bilateral contracts to anonymous markets
rises with trade liberalization because d ln cBx/d ln τ = − ρ1−ρ
[
1− ρ−θρ(1−θ)d lnP/d ln τ
]
.
Joint Contracts
The profit function of importer d from selling the product of exporter c in a joint contract is
piJcd(d) =p(qcd, qc, Qˆ)qcd − τaTcd.
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The exporter’s profit from selling to importers is
pic =
ˆ dmax(c)
dmin(c)
[Tcd − τcdqcd − fdx] dGd.
Under bilateral Nash bargaining, the optimal payment is
τaTˆcd = [βpcd + (1− β)τaτcd] qcd + (1− β)τafdx + (1− β)τapidiscd (c)− βpidiscd (d).
The joint surplus from an exporter-importer transaction is piJcd =
[
p(qcd, qc, Qˆ)− τaτcd
]
qcd. The
importer earns piJcd(d) = (1−β)
(
piJcd − τafdx
)−(1−β)τapidisc +βpidisd and the exporter earns piJcd(c) =
Tcd − τcdqcd − fdx = β
(
τ−1a piJcd − fdx
)
+ (1− β)pidisc − βτ−1a pidisd .
Summing over all importers, the joint contract maximizes:
max
qcd
β
ˆ dJmax(c)
dJmin(c)
[
τ−1a
(
p(qcd, qc, Qˆ)− τaτcd
)
qcd − fdx
]
dGd.
The optimal final price is pJcd = τaτcd/ρ and the joint surplus is
piJcd = (1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
d/d¯
)η/(η−1)
.
The disagreement payoffs of exporters and importers are
pidisc =β
[
τ−1a (1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
vdd/d¯
)η/(η−1) − fdx]
pidisd = (1− β)
[
(1− η)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1) (τaτcd¯/ρ)ρ/(ρ−1) (ρvcd/τaτηd¯)η/(η−1) − τafdx]
Therefore, the exporters and importers earn the following equilibrium profits:
piJcd(c) =βJ(1− ρ)τ−1a P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
d/d¯
)η/(η−1) − βfdx
piJcd(d) = (1− βJ) (1− ρ)P (ρ−θ)/(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
d/d¯
)η/(η−1) − (1− β)τafdx
As earlier, lower trade costs (both iceberg and ad-valorem) make substitution through learning less
viable for the importer. Lower trade costs therefore strengthen the bargaining power of exporters
and increase their share of the joint surplus.
Exporter c finds it optimal to sell to importers with costs below dJmax(c) which is defined as
ρ
1− ρ
1− η
η
[
pcdJmax − τaτcdJmax
]
qcdJmax = τafdx.
Substituting for the optimal price,
ρ
1− ρ
1− η
η
(1− ρ)τ−1a P
ρ−θ
(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcd¯/ρ
)ρ/(ρ−1) (
dJmax/d¯
)η/(η−1)
=fdx.
Under Pareto cost draws, the importer cost cutoff for exporter c is(
dJmax
dmax
)kd− ρ1−ρ 1−ηη (kd+ ηη−1)
=
(
kd
kd +
η
η−1
) 1−η
η
ρ
1−ρ−1 (1− η)ρ
ηfdx
τ−1a P
ρ−θ
(ρ−1)(θ−1)
(
τaτcdmax
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
.
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The total profit from all importers for exporter c is
pic =
(
kd
kd + η/(η − 1)
η
1− η
1− ρ
ρ
βJ
β
− 1
)
βfdx
(
dJmax(c)/dmax
)kd
Exporters prefer joint contracts over bilateral contracts as long as piJc − piBc ≥ fjx − fbx. For
d lnP/d ln τ ≤ 1, the cost cutoff for exporters who prefer joint contracts to bilateral contracts rises
with trade liberalization because(
1− piBc /piJc
)
kdρ/(1− ρ)
kd − (kd + η/(η − 1)) 1−ηη ρ1−ρ
[
1 +
ρ− θ
ρ(1− θ)
d lnP
d ln τ
+
d ln cJx
d ln τ
]
=
βJ
β
η
1−η
1−ρ
ρ
kd
kd+η/(η−1)
βJ
β
η
1−η
1−ρ
ρ
kd
kd+η/(η−1) − 1
d lnβJ
d ln τ
.
As d lnβJ/d ln τ < 0, more varieties move from bilateral contracts to joint contracts after a fall in
trade costs.
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